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God, the Best, and Evil, by bruce Langtry. Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. 
ix + 237. $70 (cloth).
wILLIAM L. rOwe, Purdue University
Langtry’s book is a significant contribution to the seemingly eternal prob-
lem of trying to explain how there can be such a vast amount of evil and 
horrific suffering in a world that God has chosen to create. I suspect that 
some who read this book will believe that he makes his task considerably 
less difficult by declining to accept the standard Anselmian conception 
of God as “an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being” who neces-
sarily exists; giving as his reason that to do so “would impede substantial 
debates currently taking place amongst theists, on such topics as whether 
God is omnipotent and omniscient, as distinct from supremely powerful 
and knowledgeable” (p. 7). In place of the Anselmian conception of God, 
Langtry proposes that we view God as a contingent being who is such 
that if he exists he is “the rational agent who brought the universe into 
existence and who is, either non-temporally or at all times, very powerful, 
very knowledgeable, and very good” (p. 7). recognizing, however, that 
such a conception of God is considerably different from the idea of God 
toward which, for example, the problem of evil has largely been directed, 
Langtry states that, for purposes of this book, the claim ‘God exists’ “un-
less there is a local indication to the contrary” is to be understood as fol-
lows: “God is the rational agent who brought the universe into existence 
and who is, either non-temporally or at all times, omnipotent, infallibly 
omniscient, and perfectly good” (p. 9). He does not, however, go so far as 
to suggest that God is a necessary being, rather than a contingent being.
Langtry begins by considering some of the apparent implications of 
divine omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness for God’s provi-
dence with respect to the world he creates. In particular, he investigates 
whether God is in some sense a maximizer. by ‘a maximizer’ I believe 
Langtry means one who always seeks to do the best he can, provided there 
is a best that can be done. Second, he critically examines objections to the 
existence of God that are based on the apparent fact that God could have 
created a better world than the one he has in fact created. And third, he 
assesses the strength of objections to the existence of God that focus on the 
problem of evil.
To create a (possible) world is to strongly or weakly actualize it. A world 
is prime if God can create it, and he cannot create a world better than it. 
Langtry’s conclusions include the following:
(1) If there is at least one prime world, then if God does create some world 
he will create a prime world.
(2) If there are no prime worlds, then it does not follow that God does not exist. 
Instead, what follows is that if God creates a world he will create one that is 
good enough, despite the fact that he could create a world which is better.
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(3) This conclusion does not give rise to a good objection to theism, based 
on the apparent fact that the actual world is improvable and yet it is not 
good enough.
(4) even if there is a best world, or several equal-best worlds, God cannot 
create any of them.
(5) A good partial theodicy for evil can be provided, appealing to goods 
bound up with human free will, moral responsibility, and the roles of 
individuals’ own personal traits in shaping their own and other people’s 
lives. The partial theodicy is neutral between Theological compatibilism 
and libertarianism.
(6) The problem of evil does not provide a very strong objection to the exis-
tence of God.
As noted above, Langtry sets forth the following conception of God: “(if 
God exists) God is the rational agent who brought the universe into exis-
tence and who is, either non-temporally or at all times, very powerful, very 
knowledgeable, and very good” (p. 7). From this and other remarks he 
makes, it is reasonably clear that Langtry’s own view is that God is a con-
tingent being—he exists in some possible worlds, but in other worlds he 
does not exist. In my judgment this is a somewhat diminished view of God. 
For it allows one to imagine God as bowing down and thanking his lucky 
stars that the actual world just happens to be one of the worlds in which he 
exists. In its place, I would suggest the following: God, an omnipotent, om-
niscient, perfectly good being, is such that if he exists in any possible world 
he exists in every possible world. On this conception, God is either a neces-
sary being (exists in every possible world) or an impossible being (exists in 
no possible world). Moreover, unless I am mistaken, it is a conception of 
God that is acceptable to many theists, agnostics, and atheists.
Langtry carefully describes three distinct positions on divine provi-
dence: Theological Determinism, Molinism, and Open Theism, but fo-
cuses mainly on Molinism and Open Theism. Theological determinism is 
the view that God directly brings about every contingent state of affairs, 
a view that appears to preclude acts that are freely done by human be-
ings. Molinism allows that God knows the “counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom” (what a person would freely choose to do should that person 
happen to be in a certain situation), and therefore knows what a person 
will freely choose to do in situation X, should that person be in situation X; 
whereas Open Theism denies that God possesses such knowledge. 
Putting aside Theological Determinism, a view which appears to pre-
clude any significant degree of human freedom, so far as the debate be-
tween Molinism and Open Theism is concerned, my own view (for what 
it is worth) is strongly on the side of Molinism. For Molinism, while allow-
ing for libertarian free choices among human creatures, provides a way in 
which God has some knowledge of what his human creatures will freely 
choose to do in their future free actions. For, according to Molinism, God 
knows the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—and such knowledge 
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provides God with the means of having some degree of influence over the 
future of the world he has created. In Open Theism, God is understood to 
be somewhat in the dark concerning what his human creatures will freely 
choose to do in their future free actions. 
It is reasonably clear, I believe, that Langtry’s own view is much closer 
to Open Theism than it is to Molinism. His view appears to be this: if there 
is a best world, God (a perfect being) will or must create it. If there is no 
best world, i.e., if for every possible world there is a better possible world, 
God will create a world that is “good enough”; never mind that he could 
have created a much better world instead. Langtry doesn’t suggest what 
conditions would render a world “good enough” should there be an un-
ending series of increasingly better creatable worlds. Clearly, however, as 
a theist he believes that a world containing the holocaust—the extermina-
tion of approximately six million european Jews as part of a program of 
deliberate extermination planned and executed by the National Socialist 
German workers’ Party during Hitler’s regime—is a world that is good 
enough for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being to create, 
even supposing such a being could have created a much better world in-
stead. However, as a theist who appears to side with Open Theism, Lang-
try, I suspect, must allow the possibility that God, in looking back at the 
holocaust, might say to himself: “if only I had known that this would hap-
pen, I would have endeavored to create a better world than this one.” The-
ists who hold to the Anselmian view of God (an omnipotent, omniscient, 
perfectly good being who necessarily exists) emphasize the importance 
of human free will and introduce interesting theodicies in an effort to set 
forth a plausible explanation of why an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly 
good being would permit so much horrendous evil to occur in the world. 
For on the Anselmian view, given that God knows the counterfactuals of 
freedom, God does have knowledge of the future free acts of his human 
creatures, and thus may know, for example, that apart from His interven-
tion, the holocaust will occur.
As Langtry notes, in my book Can God Be Free? I advance the following 
principle as a necessary truth.
B: If an omniscient being creates a world (a maximal state of affairs) 
when it could have created a better world, then it is possible that there 
be a being morally better than it.
If Principle B expresses a necessary truth and there exists an infinity of 
increasingly better worlds, then no being who creates a world can be an 
omniscient and morally perfect being. Langtry denies Principle b, agree-
ing that if there is a best world, God, a perfectly good being, must create 
it; but allowing that should there be an unending series of increasingly 
better creatable worlds God would be free to create a good world, even 
though there is an infinity of increasing better creatable worlds. He calls 
this satisficing: selecting a world that is good enough even though there 
is an infinity of increasingly better worlds, any one of which is creatable 
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by an omnipotent, omniscient being. Such a view was set forth in his pa-
per ‘God and the best’ (Faith and Philosophy, 13 [1996], pp. 311–328). Now 
that I’ve read his recently published book, God the Best, and Evil, and un-
derstand more fully that he personally thinks of God not as a necessary 
being but as a contingent being, a being who, instead of actually being 
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, is only “very powerful, very 
knowledgeable, and very good,” I can understand more clearly why he 
feels justified in rejecting the view that the vast amount of human and 
animal suffering on our planet counts significantly against the existence 
of God. For if God is merely a contingent being, a being who has consider-
able power and knowledge, but falls far short of being omnipotent, om-
niscient, perfectly good, and eternal, it is to some extent understandable 
why there might be such vast amounts of evil and suffering in our world. 
For such a being as Langtry understands God to be may simply lack any 
significant knowledge of what his creatures may choose to do in their 
future free acts.
Moreover, if Langtry’s God doesn’t know what the future of our world 
will be so far as the free actions of his human creatures are concerned, it 
is understandable that although there may be other creatable worlds any 
one of which he could have created instead—worlds in which his human 
creatures freely choose to do much more good and much less evil—God, 
as Langtry conceives of him, may not know this, and thus might be in 
the dark as to whether his selection of a particular world to create would 
result in a better or a worse world than some other world he could have 
selected to create instead. So, given Langtry’s conception of God, he is cor-
rect to conclude that principle b is simply inapplicable to God. For God, 
as Langtry conceives of him, fails to be omniscient in the sense of pos-
sessing knowledge of the future free acts of his human creatures. There-
fore, although Langtry’s God may be the greatest of existing beings, he 
falls far short of being “the greatest possible being.” In fact, Langtry views 
God as displaying human emotions of anger, and perhaps despair. Thus, 
he quotes approvingly william Hasker’s description of God as “taking 
risks” and as experiencing “aversion, anger, or disappointment over the 
actual course of events” (p. 28). Again, I believe, we are confronted with 
a rather diminished view of God—a being who does not know what he 
will confront in the future, who wonders what his free creatures will do 
tomorrow, hopes for the best, but fears the worst, and becomes angry and 
frustrated when things don’t go as well as he hoped they would. Perhaps 
some, or even many human beings will find comfort and satisfaction in 
such a conception of God, but others, I suspect, will see it as a significantly 
diminished view of God in comparison with the Anselmian view in which 
God is understood to be the greatest possible being: a necessarily existing 
being who created the world and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, 
and perfectly good.
Nevertheless, I suspect that the horrific evils, both natural and moral, 
that afflict human and animal life on our planet constitute somewhat less 
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of a problem if one holds the view that God is a contingent being and, 
although very good, powerful, and knowledgeable, falls short of being 
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. For if God has little, if any, 
foreknowledge of what the future will bring he simply may be unable to 
take the appropriate steps to prevent horrendous evils from occurring. 
However, to avoid confusion, we must keep in mind Langtry’s initial com-
mitment that “unless there is a local indication to the contrary” the con-
ception of God under consideration is to be understood as follows: “God 
is the rational agent who brought the universe into existence and who is, 
either non-temporally or at all times, omnipotent, infallibly omniscient, 
and perfectly good” (p. 9). So, it is only when Langtry is considering his 
own preferred conception of God that we need refrain from viewing the 
God under consideration as lacking omniscience, omnipotence, and per-
fect goodness.
Although Langtry rejects my principle b, he does endorse a somewhat 
weaker principle that approaches principle b: “Other things being equal, 
in intentionally bringing about the better state of affairs one acts in the 
morally better way” (p. 322). Moreover, at one point he explicitly states: 
“A being who could have acted in a morally better way is not morally per-
fect” (p. 323). while this remark may appear to be quite close to principle 
b, Langtry carefully adds the statement: “This principle can easily be mis-
understood. It does not entail that if there are no prime worlds then God 
is not perfectly good.” even if we allow Langtry’s claim that God’s perfect 
goodness is compatible with there being no prime worlds, this question 
remains: does the statement: “A being created a world with free human 
creatures, when he could have created a much better world with free hu-
man creatures” imply that the being in question could have acted “in a 
morally better way”? If so, then I suspect that it remains reasonable to seri-
ously question whether God, a perfectly good being, exists.
Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatized? by roger Trigg. Oxford 
University Press, 2007. Pp. 262. $65 (cloth)
NICHOLAS wOLTerSTOrFF, Yale University and University of Virginia
roger Trigg’s Religion in Public Life is a wide-ranging discussion of the 
many problems posed by the presence of religious diversity within mod-
ern liberal democratic states. The basic thesis which shapes the discussion 
is stated in brief summary form at the end of the book: “Public debate 
about the proper basis for society is necessary, and religious voices should 
be heard in that debate. religion has not just been one of the most forma-
tive influences on human society; religions make claims, which, if true, 
would be of universal importance. religious voices must be heard in the 
public life of every country” (p. 235).
